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Abstract. We study the effect of vaccination on robustness of networks against
propagating attacks that obey the susceptible-infected-removed model. By extending
the generating function formalism developed by Newman (2005), we analytically
determine the robustness of networks that depends on the vaccination parameters.
We consider the random defense where nodes are vaccinated randomly and the degree-
based defense where hubs are preferentially vaccinated. We show that when vaccines
are inefficient, the random graph is more robust against propagating attacks than
the scale-free network. When vaccines are relatively efficient, the scale-free network
with the degree-based defense is more robust than the random graph with the random
defense and the scale-free network with the random defense.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc,87.23.Ge,05.70.Fh,64.60.aq
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1. Introduction
Many real networks, such as the WWW, the Internet, social and biological networks,
have complex connectivity. A property shared by many types of networks is the
scale-free (SF) degree distribution pk ∝ k
−γ , where k is degree (number of links
connected to a node) and pk is the fraction of nodes with degree k [1]. Functions
of networks crucially depend on the degree distribution and other structural properties
of networks [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8].
An important property of networks is robustness against the removal of nodes
caused by failures or intentional attacks. Albert et al. studied the robustness of networks
against two types of attacks: random failure, where nodes are sequentially removed with
equal probability, and intentional attack, where hubs (i.e., nodes with large degrees) are
preferentially removed [9]. They showed that SF networks having γ ≤ 3 are highly
robust against the random failure in the sense that almost all nodes have to be removed
to disintegrate a SF network. However, SF networks are fragile to the intentional attack
in the sense that the network is destroyed if a small fraction of hubs are removed.
These results have been analytically established [10, 11, 12]. The robustness of networks
against other percolation-like processes such as the betweenness-based attack [13] and
degree-weighted attacks [14] have also been studied.
In fact, attacks to networks may occur as propagating processes. Examples
include computer viruses [15, 16, 17]. The (first) critical infection rate above which
a global outbreak occurs has been obtained for propagating processes such as the
susceptible-infected-removed (SIR) and susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) models.
In particular, for SF networks with γ ≤ 3, any positive infection rate induces a global
outbreak [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 17, 18, 19] (also see a recent paper [20] in which it is shown
that the critical infection rate of the SIS model on SF networks vanishes regardless of the
value of γ). Another (second) critical infection rate, above which the network remaining
after all the infected nodes are deleted (we call it residual network) is disintegrated,
also exists and is larger than the first critical infection rate. The residual network
is important because a second epidemic spread may occur on it [21, 22, 23, 24]. By
using the generating functions, Newman derived the second critical infection rate for
uncorrelated networks to show that the second critical infection rate is positive even for
γ ≤ 3 [21]. In particular, the global outbreak of a second epidemic requires a larger
infection rate than that of a first epidemic [21].
Defense (i.e., immunization) strategies for networks to contain epidemics are also
of practical importance. Epidemics can be efficiently suppressed by various defense
strategies such as target immunization [25, 26], acquaintance immunization [26, 27, 28,
29], and graph partitioning immunization [30]. Such a defense strategy raises the first
critical infection rate. In contrast, we study the effectiveness of a defense strategy in
enhancing the robustness of networks, i.e., increasing the second critical infection rate.
Using the generating functions [21, 31], we formulate the effects of defense strategies
on the robustness of networks. We determine the two critical infection rates for the
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Figure 1. Propagating attack on networks (a) without and (b) with a defense strategy.
T and Tfv are the probabilities that an infected (and eventually removed) node infects
an unvaccinated and vaccinated neighbor in a propagating attack, respectively.
following three combinations of networks and defense strategies: random graph with
the random defense, in which nodes are vaccinated in a random order, uncorrelated
SF network with the random defense, and uncorrelated SF network with the degree-
based defense, in which nodes are vaccinated in the descending order of the degree.
When vaccines are inefficient, the random graph is more robust than the SF network in
the sense that the second critical infection rate is larger. When vaccines are relatively
efficient, the SF network with the degree-based defense is more robust than the other
two cases. We also discuss the optimization of the vaccine allocation under a trade-off
between the number and efficiency of vaccines available.
2. Model
We adopt the SIR model, which is a continuous-time Markov process on a given static
network with N nodes, as the propagating attack. Each node takes one of the three
states: susceptible, infected, and removed. All nodes except a randomly selected seed
node are initially susceptible. The seed node is initially infected. Susceptible nodes get
infected at a rate proportional to the number of infected neighbors. In other words, if
a susceptible node is adjacent to an infected node, the susceptible node gets infected
with probability β∆t within short time ∆t. An infected node becomes removed at a
unit rate, i.e., with probability ∆t within short time ∆t, irrespective of the neighbors’
states.
Following the methods employed in previous literature [31, 32], we analyze the
bond percolation to estimate the transition points, the final size of global outbreaks,
and that of residual networks of the SIR model. We assume that the disease is
transmitted from an infected node to a susceptible node with probability T = T (β),
where T =
∫
[1− exp(−βτ)]P (τ)dτ , τ is the infectious period during which the infected
node is infected, and P (τ) is the distribution of τ [31, 32]. In other words, we map
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the SIR dynamics onto the bond percolation with open bond probability T . Strictly
speaking, this mapping is not generally exact [33, 34, 35]. The transition point above
which a global outbreak occurs and the mean final size of global outbreaks at a given
T obtained from the analysis of the bond percolation are precise for the SIR model.
However, the bond percolation fails to predict the probability of global outbreaks in the
SIR model [33, 34, 35]. The correspondence between the bond percolation and the SIR
model is exact if the infectious period in the SIR model is assumed to be constant. When
analyzing the effects of defense strategies (Sec. 3.2), we denote by Ti the probability that
susceptible node i is infected by an infected neighbor. We set Ti = T for all i unless
otherwise stated.
After a propagating attack, each node is either susceptible or removed (figure 1(a)).
We call the network composed of removed nodes and that composed of susceptible nodes
infected network and residual network, respectively. The infected network consists of
a single component because an attack starts from a single seed. When T is below a
first transition point Tc1, the size of the infected network is o(N), whereas the residual
network includes a giant component of order O(N). When Tc1 < T < Tc2, where Tc2 is a
second transition point, both the infected and residual networks have a giant component
of order O(N). When T > Tc2, the giant component of the residual network is absent.
We consider two defense strategies. In the random defense, Nf randomly selected
nodes are vaccinated. In the degree-based defense, Nf nodes with the largest degrees
are vaccinated. We assume that Ti decreases to Ti = Tfv (0 ≤ fv < 1) for a vaccinated
node i (figure 1(b)). In epidemiology, the vaccine with fv = 0 and that with fv 6= 0 are
called perfect and leaky vaccination, respectively [22, 36].
3. Analysis
3.1. SIR Model on Networks
In the following, we consider uncorrelated, locally tree-like networks with arbitrary
degree distributions. In this section, we quickly review the derivation of Tc1 and Tc2 in
the absence of a defense strategy [21, 31].
We denote by pk the fraction of nodes with degree k. We denote by qk the
distribution of the excess degree defined as the degree of the node reached by following
a randomly selected link minus 1; qk = (k+1)pk+1/〈k〉, where 〈·〉 represents the average
of a quantity weighted by pk. We define
F0(x) ≡
∑
k
pkx
k, (1)
F1(x) ≡
∑
k
qkx
k =
∑
k
kpk
〈k〉
xk−1. (2)
The giant component of the infected network is present if [21]
T > Tc1 =
〈k〉
〈k2 − k〉
. (3)
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Figure 2. Schematics of (a) FU0 (x), (b) G
U
0 (x, y), (c) P
U
0 (x, y), and (d) P
V
0 (x, y).
To derive Tc2, let u be the probability that a node is not infected by a specific
neighbor in a propagating attack. After a propagating attack, a node is susceptible
with probability
∑
k pku
k = F0(u), and a node reached by following a link is susceptible
with probability
∑
k qku
k = F1(u). The following recursive relationship determines u:
u = 1− T + TF1(u). (4)
The probability that a node is susceptible in the residual network and its randomly
selected neighbor is removed is equal to (1− T )[1− F1(u)] = u− F1(u). Therefore, the
probability that a node in the residual network has m susceptible neighbors, i.e., the
degree distribution of the residual network, is represented as
1
F0(u)
∞∑
k=m
pk
(
k
m
)
F1(u)
m[u− F1(u)]
k−m. (5)
The corresponding generating function P0(x) is given by
P0(x) =
1
F0(u)
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
k=m
pk
(
k
m
)
F1(u)
m[u− F1(u)]
k−mxm
Robustness of networks against propagating attacks under vaccination strategies 6
=
1
F0(u)
∞∑
k=0
pk[F1(u)(x− 1) + u]
k =
F0[F1(u)(x− 1) + u]
F0(u)
. (6)
Similarly, the generating function P1(x) for the excess degree distribution of the residual
network is represented as
P1(x) =
F1[F1(u)(x− 1) + u]
F1(u)
. (7)
From Eq. (7), the mean excess degree of the residual network, denoted by 〈kex〉res, is
calculated as
〈kex〉res =
d
dx
P1(x)
∣∣∣
x=1
= F ′1(u). (8)
The giant component of the residual network is absent if T > Tc2, where Tc2 is
determined by 〈kex〉res = F
′
1(u) = 1 [21].
3.2. Defense strategies against propagating attacks
In the following, we calculate Tc1 and Tc2 in the presence of the random or degree-based
defense.
3.2.1. Degree Distributions of Vaccinated and Unvaccinated Nodes in the Original
Network Under a defense strategy, each node is either unvaccinated (U) or vaccinated
(V) (figure 1(b)). First, we derive the degree distribution of U nodes and that of V
nodes in the original network. Under both defense strategies, a randomly selected node
is U with probability 1 − f and V otherwise. We denote the probability that a node
reached by following a randomly selected link is a V node by f˜ . Then, the probability
that a node reached by following a randomly selected link is a U node is equal to 1− f˜ .
Under the random defense, we obtain
f˜ = f. (9)
Under the degree-based defense, we obtain
f˜ =
∞∑
k=kcut
qk, (10)
where kcut is the minimum degree of V nodes determined by
∞∑
k=kcut
pk = f. (11)
Let pUk and p
V
k be the degree distributions of U nodes and V nodes, respectively,
and qUk and q
V
k be the distributions of the excess degrees of U nodes and V nodes,
respectively. For the random defense, we obtain
{pUk , p
V
k } = {pk, pk}, (12)
{qUk , q
V
k } = {qk, qk}, (13)
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for all k. For the degree-based defense, we obtain
{pUk , p
V
k } =
{
{pk/(1− f), 0} (k < kcut),
{0, pk/f} (kcut ≤ k),
(14)
{qUk , q
V
k } =
{
{qk/(1− f˜), 0} (k < kcut),
{0, qk/f˜} (kcut ≤ k).
(15)
3.2.2. Derivation of Tc1 We analyze the interaction of the generating functions for U
nodes and those for V nodes. Related approaches have been adopted to analyze the
percolation in networks that contain multiple types of nodes [37, 38]. We define the
following generating functions
FU0 (x) ≡
∞∑
k=0
pUk x
k, (16)
FV0 (x) ≡
∞∑
k=0
pVk x
k, (17)
FU1 (x) ≡
∞∑
k=0
qUk x
k, (18)
FV1 (x) ≡
∞∑
k=0
qVk x
k. (19)
A schematic of FU0 (x) is shown in figure 2(a).
We extend the theory developed in [39] to derive Tc1 for our model. Consider the
mean number Nℓ of removed nodes at distance ℓ from the seed node. We obtain
N1 =
∞∑
k=0
pk
k∑
m=0
(
k
m
)
[mT + (k −m)Tfv](1− f˜)
mf˜k−m
=
(
T
∂
∂x
+ Tfv
∂
∂y
)
F0[(1− f˜)x+ f˜ y]
∣∣∣
x,y=1
= [T (1− f˜) + Tfvf˜ ]F
′
0(1), (20)
N2 =
∞∑
k=0
pk
k∑
m=0
(
k
m
)
(1− f˜)mf˜k−m
×
{
mT
∞∑
k′=0
qUk′
k′∑
m′=0
(
k′
m′
)
[m′T + (k′ −m′)Tfv](1− f˜)
m′ f˜k
′
−m′
+ (k −m)Tfv
∞∑
k′=0
qVk′
k′∑
m′=0
(
k′
m′
)
[m′T + (k′ −m′)Tfv](1− f˜)
m′ f˜k
′
−m′
}
= F ′0(1)[T (1− f˜) + Tfvf˜ ][T (1− f˜)F
U
1
′
(1) + Tfvf˜F
V
1
′
(1)], (21)
and
Nℓ = F
′
0(1)[T (1− f˜) + Tfvf˜ ][T (1− f˜)F
U
1
′
(1) + Tfvf˜F
V
1
′
(1)]ℓ−1 =
(N2
N1
)ℓ−1
N1, (22)
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for any ℓ ≥ 1. The infected network is a giant component if and only if N2 > N1, or
equivalently,
N2
N1
= T (1− f˜)FU1
′
(1) + Tfvf˜F
V
1
′
(1) > 1. (23)
Therefore, Tc1 is determined from
Tc1[(1− f˜)F
U
1
′
(1) + fvf˜F
V
1
′
(1)] = 1. (24)
In the case of the random defense, where FU1
′
(1) = FV1
′
(1) = F ′1(1) and f˜ = f ,
Eq. (24) is reduced to
Tc1[(1− f) + fvf ]
〈k(k − 1)〉
〈k〉
= 1. (25)
3.2.3. Derivation of Tc2 The probability that a randomly selected U node has exactly
m U neighbors is equal to
∑
∞
k=m p
U
k
(
k
m
)
(1− f˜)mf˜k−m. The generating function GU0 (x, y)
for this probability distribution, which is schematically shown in figure 2(b), is given by
GU0 (x, y) ≡
∞∑
k=0
pUk
k∑
m=0
(
k
m
)
(1−f˜)mf˜k−mxmyk−m = FU0 [(1−f˜)x+f˜ y].(26)
The generating function GV0 (x, y) for the probability distribution that a V node has m
U neighbors is given by
GV0 (x, y) ≡
∞∑
k=0
pVk
k∑
m=0
(
k
m
)
(1−f˜)mf˜k−mxmyk−m = FV0 [(1−f˜)x+f˜y].(27)
Similarly, we obtain
GU1 (x, y) ≡
∞∑
k=0
qUk
k∑
m=0
(
k
m
)
(1−f˜)mf˜k−mxmyk−m = FU1 [(1−f˜)x+f˜y], (28)
GV1 (x, y) ≡
∞∑
k=0
qVk
k∑
m=0
(
k
m
)
(1−f˜)mf˜k−mxmyk−m = FV1 [(1−f˜)x+f˜y].(29)
Let uXY (X, Y ∈ {U, V }) be the probability that an X node is not infected by
a specific Y neighbor in a propagating attack. Then, a U node is susceptible with
probability GU0 (uUU, uUV), and a V node is susceptible with probability G
V
0 (uVU, uVV).
A U node connected to a randomly selected link is susceptible with probability
GU1 (uUU, uUV), and a V node connected to a random selected link is susceptible with
probability GV1 (uVU, uVV). Then, uUU, uUV, uVU, and uVV satisfy the following recursive
relationships:
uUU = 1− T + TG
U
1 (uUU, uUV), (30)
uUV = 1− T + TG
V
1 (uVU, uVV), (31)
uVU = 1− Tfv + TfvG
U
1 (uUU, uUV), (32)
uVV = 1− Tfv + TfvG
V
1 (uVU, uVV). (33)
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To derive the degree distribution of U nodes in the residual network, consider a
focal U node. When the focal U node is adjacent to a U node, the probability that the
U neighbor is (infected and) eventually removed and the U focal node is not infected by
this U neighbor in a propagating attack is equal to
(1− T )[1−GU1 (uUU, uUV)] = uUU −G
U
1 (uUU, uUV). (34)
When the focal U node is adjacent to a V node, the probability that the V neighbor is
eventually removed and the focal U node is not infected by this V neighbor is equal to
(1− T )[1−GV1 (uVU, uVV)] = uUV −G
V
1 (uVU, uVV). (35)
Then, the probability that a U node has m susceptible U neighbors and n susceptible
V neighbors and is not infected is equal to
∞∑
k=m+n
k−n∑
m′=m
pUk
(
k
m′
)
(1− f˜)m
′
f˜k−m
′
(
m′
m
)
GU1 (uUU, uUV)
m[uUU −G
U
1 (uUU, uUV)]
m′−m
×
(
k −m′
n
)
GV1 (uVU, uVV)
n[uUV −G
V
1 (uVU, uVV)]
k−m′−n.
Therefore, the generating function PU0 (x, y) for the degree distribution of U nodes in
the residual network (figure 2(c)) is given by
PU0 (x, y) =
1
GU0 (uUU, uUV)
∞∑
k=0
pUk
k∑
m′=0
(
k
m′
)
(1− f˜)m
′
f˜k−m
′
×
m′∑
m=0
(
m′
m
)
GU1 (uUU, uUV)
m[uUU −G
U
1 (uUU, uUV)]
m′−mxm
×
k−m′∑
n=0
(
k −m′
n
)
GV1 (uVU, uVV)
n[uUV −G
V
1 (uVU, uVV)]
k−m′−nyn
=
GU0 [G
U
1 (uUU, uUV)(x− 1) + uUU, G
V
1 (uVU, uVV)(y − 1) + uUV]
GU0 (uUU, uUV)
. (36)
We can similarly derive the degree distribution of V nodes in the residual network.
When a focal V node is adjacent to a U node, the probability that the U neighbor is
eventually removed and the focal V node is not infected by this U neighbor is equal to
(1− Tfv)[1−G
U
1 (uUU, uUV)] = uVU −G
U
1 (uUU, uUV). (37)
When the focal V node is adjacent to a V node, the probability that the V neighbor is
eventually removed and the focal V node is not infected by this V neighbor is equal to
(1− Tfv)[1−G
V
1 (uVU, uVV)] = uVV −G
V
1 (uVU, uVV). (38)
The generating function PV0 (x, y) for the degree distribution of V nodes in the residual
network (figure 2(d)) is given by
PV0 (x, y) =
1
GV0 (uVU, uVV)
∞∑
k=0
pVk
k∑
m′=0
(
k
m′
)
(1− f˜)m
′
f˜k−m
′
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×
m′∑
m=0
(
m′
m
)
GU1 (uUU, uUV)
m[uVU −G
U
1 (uUU, uUV)]
m′−mxm
×
k−m′∑
n=0
(
k −m′
n
)
GV1 (uVU, uVV)
n[uVV −G
V
1 (uVU, uVV)]
k−m′−nyn
=
GV0 [G
U
1 (uUU, uUV)(x− 1) + uVU, G
V
1 (uVU, uVV)(y − 1) + uVV]
GV0 (uVU, uVV)
. (39)
Similarly, the generating functions for the excess degree distributions of U nodes
and V nodes in the residual network are given by
PU1 (x, y) =
GU1 [G
U
1 (uUU, uUV)(x− 1) + uUU, G
V
1 (uVU, uVV)(y − 1) + uUV]
GU1 (uUU, uUV)
, (40)
and
PV1 (x, y) =
GV1 [G
U
1 (uUU, uUV)(x− 1) + uVU, G
V
1 (uVU, uVV)(y − 1) + uVV]
GV1 (uVU, uVV)
, (41)
respectively.
When we follow a randomly selected link in the residual network, we reach a U
node with probability
(1− f˜)GU1 (uUU, uUV)
(1− f˜)GU1 (uUU, uUV) + f˜G
V
1 (uVU, uVV)
.
Otherwise, we reach a V node. Then, the mean excess degree of the residual network is
given by
〈kex〉res =
( ∂
∂x
+
∂
∂y
)(1− f˜)GU1 (uUU, uUV)PU1 (x, y) + f˜GV1 (uVU, uVV)PV1 (x, y)
(1− f˜)GU1 (uUU, uUV) + f˜G
V
1 (uVU, uVV)
∣∣∣
x,y=1
= (1− f˜)FU1
′
[(1− f˜)uUU + f˜uUV] + f˜F
V
1
′
[(1− f˜)uVU + f˜uVV]. (42)
Because the second transition point is given by 〈kex〉res = 1, we find Tc2 by solving
(1− f˜)FU1
′
[(1− f˜)uUU + f˜uUV] + f˜F
V
1
′
[(1− f˜)uVU + f˜uVV] = 1. (43)
3.2.4. Component Size The generating function formalism also gives the component
size of the infected and residual networks. Because a randomly selected U node is
susceptible with probability GU0 (uUU, uUV) and a randomly selected V node is susceptible
with probability GV0 (uVU, uVV), the component size of the infected network Sinf is
represented as
Sinf = 1− (1− f)G
U
0 (uUU, uUV)− fG
V
0 (uVU, uVV). (44)
To derive the largest component size of the residual network, we denote by HU0 (x)
and HV0 (x) the generating functions for the size of the finite components of the residual
networks to which a randomly selected U node and V node belong [3]. The average size
Sres of the largest component of the residual network relative to the size of the original
network is given by
Sres = (1− Sinf)
[
1−
GU0 (uUU, uUV)H
U
0 (1) +G
V
0 (uVU, uVV)H
V
0 (1)
GU0 (uUU, uUV) +G
V
0 (uVU, uVV)
]
, (45)
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where
HU0 (1) = P
U
0 (A,B), (46)
HV0 (1) = P
V
0 (A,B), (47)
A ≡ HU1 (1) = P
U
1 (A,B), (48)
B ≡ HV1 (1) = P
V
1 (A,B). (49)
3.2.5. Degree-dependent Probability of Infection We denote by U(k) the probability
that a node with degree k is uninfected. Because a U node is susceptible with probability
GU0 (uUU, uUV) and a V node is susceptible with probability G
V
0 (uVU, uVV), U(k) is given
by
∞∑
k=0
pkU(k) = (1− f)G
U
0 (uUU, uUV) + fG
V
0 (uVU, uVV)
= (1− f)
∞∑
k=0
pUk [(1− f˜)uUU + f˜uUV]
k + f
∞∑
k=0
pVk [(1− f˜)uVU + f˜uVV]
k. (50)
For the random defense, pUk and p
V
k are given by Eq. (12). Therefore, Eq. (50) is reduced
to
∞∑
k=0
pkU(k) =
∞∑
k=0
pk{(1− f)[(1− f)uUU + fuUV]
k + f [(1− f)uVU + fuVV]
k}. (51)
Because Eq. (51) is satisfied for an arbitrary degree distribution {pk}, we obtain
U(k) = (1− f)[(1− f)uUU + fuUV]
k + f [(1− f)uVU + fuVV]
k. (52)
For the degree-based defense, pUk and p
V
k are given by Eq. (14). Therefore, Eq. (50) is
reduced to
∞∑
k=0
pkU(k) =
kcut−1∑
k=0
pk[(1− f˜)uUU + f˜uUV]
k +
∞∑
k=kcut
pk[(1− f˜)uVU + f˜uVV]
k. (53)
Because Eq. (53) is satisfied for arbitrary {pk}, we obtain
U(k) =
{
[(1− f˜)uUU + f˜uUV]
k (k < kcut),
[(1− f˜)uVU + f˜uVV]
k (kcut ≤ k).
(54)
4. Numerical Results
On the basis of the theoretical results obtained in Sec. 3, we numerically examine the
robustnesses of different networks against the propagating attack. We consider the
following three combinations of networks and defense strategies:
(i) random graph with random defense,
(ii) uncorrelated SF network with random defense, and
(iii) uncorrelated SF network with degree-based defense.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3. Component size Sinf of the infected network (dashed lines) and the largest
component size Sres of the residual network (solid lines) for (a) random graph with the
random defense (case (i)), (b) SF network with the random defense (case (ii)), and (c)
SF network with the degree-based defense (case (iii)). We set f = 0.05. The different
lines correspond to fv = 0.00, 0.50, and 1.00, from right to left.
We assume that the SF network has degree distribution pk ∝ k
−3, where k ≥ kmin ≡ 2,
which yields 〈k〉 ≃ 3.19. For a fair comparison, we assume that 〈k〉 of the random
graph is equal to that of the SF network. For the random graph, we obtain F0(x) =
F1(x) = exp[〈k〉(x − 1)]. For the SF network, we obtain F0(x) =
∑
∞
k=0 pkx
k =
Li3(x)/Li3(1), F1(x) =
∑
∞
k=0 kpkx
k−1/
∑
∞
k=0 kpk = Li2(x)/xLi2(1), where Lin(x) is the
nth polylogarithm of x, i.e., Lin(x) ≡
∑
∞
k=1 x
kk−n. In the random defense (cases (i) and
(ii)), FU0 (x) = F
V
0 (x) = F0(x) and F
U
1 (x) = F
V
1 (x) = F1(x). In the degree-based defense
(case (iii)), we vaccinate all the nodes whose degree is equal to or larger than kcut such
that the fraction of V nodes does not exceed f . Then, we vaccinate some nodes with
degree kcut − 1 such that the total fraction of V nodes is equal to f . The other nodes
with degree kcut−1 are U nodes. The generating functions for U and V nodes are given
by
FU0 (x) =
k′
cut∑
k=0
pkx
k − Cpk′
cut
xk
′
cut, (55)
FU1 (x) =
k′
cut∑
k=0
qkx
k − Cqk′
cut
xk
′
cut , (56)
FV0 (x) =
∞∑
k=kcut
pkx
k + Cpk′
cut
xk
′
cut , (57)
FV1 (x) =
∞∑
k=kcut
qkx
k + Cqk′
cut
xk
′
cut, (58)
where C = (f −
∑
∞
k=kcut
pk)/pk′
cut
and k′cut = kcut − 1. For each case, we apply the
results of Sec. 3.2 to obtain the component sizes and transition points. For given f and
fv, we substitute F
U
0 (x), F
U
1 (x), F
V
0 (x), and F
V
1 (x) in Eq. (24) to obtain Tc1. We also
substitute FU0 (x), F
U
1 (x), F
V
0 (x), and F
V
1 (x) in Eqs. (30)–(33) to determine uUU, uUV,
uVU, and uVV. Then, we use the obtained values of uUU, uUV, uVU, and uVV to derive
Tc2, Sinf , and Sref from Eqs. (43), (44), and (45), respectively.
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Figure 4. Results for the random graph with the random defense (case (i)). (a) Tc1
and (b) Tc2 as functions of f and fv. The solid lines indicate Tc1 = 1 in (a) and
Tc2 = 1 in (b). The dashed lines indicate f(1− fv) = 0.1 and f(1− fv) = 0.2. (c) Tc2
conditioned by f(1− fv) = 0.1 (circles) and 0.2 (diamonds).
We first examine the component sizes Sinf of the infected network and Sres of the
residual network using Eqs. (44) and (45). The results for case (i) with f = 0.05 are
shown in figure 3(a). When T is small, Sinf = 0 (in the limit of the infinite network
size) holds true irrespective of the value of fv, as shown by different dashed lines in
figure 3(a). When T > Tc1 ≈ 0.33, Sinf increases and Sres decreases with an increase in
T . When T > Tc2 ≈ 0.6, we obtain Sres = 0. The precise values of Tc1 and Tc2 vary with
fv. Efficient vaccines (i.e., small fv) make Sinf small and Sres large and increase Tc1 and
Tc2.
The results for case (ii) are shown in figure 3(b). Tc1 is much smaller than in case
(i); Eq. (25) implies Tc1 = 0 when F
V
1
′
(1) diverges. For fv 6= 0, Sres behaves qualitatively
the same as that for case (i). In particular, the value of Tc2 for fv = 1 is only slightly
smaller than that for case (i). For fv = 0, Sres behaves differently; Sres > 0 even when
T = 1, implying that the residual network is never destroyed.
The results for case (iii) are shown in figure 3(c). We find that the degree-
based defense is effective at decreasing (increasing) Sinf (Sres) as compared with the
random defense (case (ii)). In particular, the perfect vaccines (i.e., fv = 0) contain the
propagating attack when T < Tc1 ≈ 0.63. We find from Eq. (24) that Tc1 6= 0 only
for fv = 0. Therefore, any leaky vaccination (i.e., fv > 0) fails to contain the attack
because FV1
′
(1) diverges. We remark that, for fv = 0, Eq. (24) is reduced to a known
result [26]
Tc1
kcut−1∑
k=0
k(k − 1)
〈k〉
pk = 1. (59)
We also remark that, for fv = 1, the value of Tc2 coincides with that for case (ii) as
expected; the effect of vaccination is completely null when fv = 1.
In figures 4, 5, and 6, Tc1 and Tc2 obtained from Eqs. (24) and (43) are shown for
the three cases.
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(a)
0.1
0.2
(b)
Figure 5. Results for the SF network with random defense (case (ii)). (a) Tc2 as
a function of f and fv. The solid line indicates Tc2 = 1. The dashed lines indicate
f(1 − fv) = 0.1 and f(1 − fv) = 0.2. (b) Tc2 conditioned by f(1 − fv) = 0.1 (circles)
and 0.2 (diamonds).
(a)
0.1
0.2
(b)
Figure 6. Results for the SF network with the degree-based defense (case (iii)). (a)
Tc2 as a function of f and fv. The solid line indicates Tc2 = 1. The dashed lines
indicate f(1 − fv) = 0.1 and f(1 − fv) = 0.2. (b) Tc2 conditioned by f(1 − fv) = 0.1
(circles) and 0.2 (diamonds).
Tc1 monotonically increases with f and monotonically decreases with fv in case (i)
(figure 4(a)). When Tc1 = 1 (the red region bounded by the bold line in figure 4(a)),
a global infection does not occur at any infection rate. On the basis of Eq. (24), the
boundary of the region Tc1 = 1 is given by
1− f + fvf =
〈k〉
〈k(k − 1)〉
. (60)
In case (ii), Tc1 = 0 for any f and fv unless (f, fv) = (1, 0). In case (iii), Tc1 = 0 if
fv > 0 or (f, fv) = (0, 0) for the following reason. If fv > 0, F
V
1
′
(1) in Eq. (23) diverges.
If f = 0, FU1
′
(1) in Eq. (23) diverges (and FV1
′
(1) = 0).
Similar to Tc1, Tc2 monotonically increases with f and monotonically decreases with
fv in all the cases (figures 4(b), 5(a), and 6(a)). When Tc2 = 1, the residual network
is not disintegrated at any infection rate (the red regions bounded by the bold line in
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(a) (b)
Figure 7. Probability U(k) that a node with degree k in the SF network is uninfected.
(a) Random defense (case (ii)). (b) Degree-based defense (case (iii)). We set T0 = 0.4
and f = 0.05. The dashed line in (b) indicates kcut = 8.
figures 4(b), 5(a), and 6(a)).
When fv = 0, the SF network yields Tc2 = 1 for any f > 0, either for the random
defense (figure 5(a)) and the degree-based defense (figure 6(a)). In this situation, V
nodes are never infected such that they percolate in a SF network. This phenomenon is
identical to the standard site percolation on SF networks with γ ≤ 3; randomly located
nodes percolate even at an infinitesimally small occupation probability [10, 11].
The comparison of the values of Tc2 among the three cases based on figures 4(b),
5(a), and 6(a) suggests the following. When the vaccines are not efficient (i.e., fv ∼ 1),
the network is the most robust for case (i) among the three cases in the sense that Tc2
is the largest. In this situation, Tc2 for the SF network is slightly smaller than that for
the random graph (also see figure 3). When fv takes an intermediate value, the network
is the most robust for case (iii). The network is the most fragile for case (ii) except for
fairly small fv and f , in which case the residual network mainly composed of vaccinated
nodes can percolate on the SF network and not on the random graph.
In reality, there may be a trade-off between the required number of vaccines and the
efficiency of vaccines. Therefore, we measure Tc2 under the constraints f(1− fv) = 0.1
and f(1 − fv) = 0.2; f and 1 − fv represent the number and efficiency of vaccines,
respectively. As shown in figures 4(c), 5(b), and 6(b), the network becomes progressively
robust as f decreases (i.e., small number of vaccines) and fv decreases (i.e., high
efficiency of vaccines) in all the three cases.
The difference between the random and degree-based defenses in the SF network is
apparent when we look at U(k), i.e., the probability that a node with degree k remains
uninfected. In figures 7(a) and 7(b), U(k) values are shown for cases (ii) (Eq. (52))
and (iii) (Eq. (54)), respectively. As expected, the degree-based defense cuts down the
probability of infection for nodes with high degrees, whereas the random defense does
not. Furthermore, the indirect effect of vaccines, i.e., the suppression of the infection
probability for U nodes, is strong under the degree-based defense. For example, some
fractions of U nodes with degree k < kcut (below the dashed line in figure 7 (b)) remain
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uninfected.
5. Summary
We investigated the effect of defense strategies on the robustness of networks against
propagating attacks by extending the generating function framework developed by
Newman [21]. In particular, under vaccination strategies, we analytically obtained the
second critical infection rate above which the residual network is disintegrated. We
applied the analytical results to the three cases: the random graph with the random
defense, the SF network with the random defense, and the SF network with the degree-
based defense. The first critical point of the SF network depends crucially on whether
the effect of the vaccines is perfect or leaky. Even under the degree-based defense, the
leaky vaccines cannot prevent a global outbreak on heterogeneous networks. We also
found that, under a trade-off between the number and efficiency of vaccines, it is better
to administer a small number of vaccines with high efficiency than vice versa to prevent
the residual network from being disintegrated.
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